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Transmitting sensitive data over non-secret channels has always required encryption technologies to ensure that the
data arrives without exposure to eavesdroppers. The Internet has made it possible to transmit vast volumes of data
more rapidly and cheaply and to a wider audience than ever before. At the same time, strong encryption makes it
possible to send data securely, to digitally sign it, to prove it was sent or received, and to guarantee its integrity.
The Internet and encryption make bulk transmission of data a commercially viable proposition. However, there are
implementation challenges to solve before commercial bulk transmission becomes mainstream. Powerful have a
performance cost, and may affect quality of service. Without encryption, intercepted data may be illicitly duplicated
and re-sold, or its commercial value diminished because its secrecy is lost. Performance degradation and potential
for commercial loss discourage the bulk transmission of data over the Internet in any commercial application.
This paper outlines technical solutions to these problems. We develop new technologies and combine existing ones
in new and powerful ways to minimise commercial loss without compromising performance or inflating overheads.
1 INTRODUCTION
Bulk transmission of data in a commercially secure yet reasonably fast way requires
encryption technology that is both secure and fast. However more powerful encryption
algorithms and longer secret keys are slower computationally, while faster encryption is
inevitably less secure. This is a natural consequence of the nature of encryption – the
speed of encryption is proportional to the speed of breaking the code by doing a brute-
force search. This leaves developers in a quandary when choosing encryption
technologies, needing to balance quality of service with security.
In this paper we look at two solutions to this performance versus security problem.
The solutions do not propose new encryption algorithms, but rather they change the way
we use them. The two new technologies are hierarchical encryption, discussed in section
2, and data fragmentation combined with signal diversity, discussed in section 3. Section
4 concludes with an outline of further work in support of these solutions. Video
transmission is used as an example application, but the same technologies can be used in
many other applications. Whenever speed and secrecy of transmission are required at the
same time, these technologies can help make a commercially-viable application.
2 HIERARCHICAL ENCRYPTION
The stronger the encryption, the harder it is to break but also the more
computationally expensive it is. A hierarchical approach to key exchange means that
simple and relatively weak encryption and keys are used to encrypt small chunks of data,
for example 10 seconds of video. Each chunk has its own key. New keys for this bottom-
level encryption are exchanged using a slightly stronger encryption, e.g. whole-video
keys could govern the exchange of the 10-second chunk keys. At a higher level, there
could be weekly keys, securing the exchange of whole-video keys, and at a yet higher
level, a subscriber key could govern the exchange of weekly keys. At higher levels, the
encryption is stronger but is used less frequently, so the overall computational cost is low.
A primary observation is that there are two main things governing the strength of
the encryption technology used to secure some data. These are:
1) the value of each encrypted item determines the strength of the encryption
algorithm used to secure it. An eavesdropper could decode a chunk in a reasonable
time but the time to decode every key for the whole video makes it not worth the
effort. The value of the data partly determines the strength of the security required.
2) the duration of secrecy required dictates the lowest cost of breaking the
encryption algorithm. Military or political data whose secrecy must last for many
years require strong encryption algorithms with long keys. Conversely, a stock
market feed whose data retains commercial value only for a few hours, needs only
to withstand cryptanalysis until the value of the data has expired. Complexity
theory can estimate how long it will take to break a given encryption with a key of
a given size, given current algorithms and processor speeds.
Any security solution should be either to expensive or should deliver the decrypted
data too slowly for the eavesdropper to use. So it is necessary to choose encryption
algorithms and key lengths suitable to the material being ciphered.
In a video stream, the entire video will have a larger value than small sections of
the video. An eavesdropper will put in more effort to break a cipher that hides an entire
video than merely a few parts of it, as the value of the video may be the resale value of
pirated copies. Similarly, an eavesdropper would put more effort again into breaking a
cipher that governed the issue of all videos to a given subscriber, and more yet again to
breaking into the security surrounding the database of all videos or of all subscribers.
Hierarchical encryption [Gilbert 2000] applies the principle of cryptographic
strength appropriate to the value and duration of secrecy of the data. It breaks data into
small chunks, e.g. breaking a video stream into 10-second excerpts. It encrypts each
chunk with a different key. This is the lowest level of encryption, and because the value
of one chunk is small, it is where we use the fastest and weakest level encryption.
At this lowest level, the encryption is applied to every chunk of data. It is also the
only encryption that is applied to the actual transmitted data (e.g. the video). However,
there are a substantial number of keys that an eavesdropper would require in order to
decipher the entire data file. For example a 90-minute video broken into ten-second
chunks would be encrypted with 540 chunk keys. If a single chunk key was
compromised, then all that would be exposed is a single ten-second excerpt of video.
The distribution of chunk keys between sending and receiving hosts is managed by
a second level of encryption. The value of the data encrypted at this level is higher, as it
secures all chunk keys. Because of the higher value of the data, a stronger encryption is
used, but the performance penalty is minimised because the encryption and decryption
are performed less frequently. Only the chunk key is encrypted and only when it changes,
for example every ten seconds. If a second-level key was compromised, all chunk keys
would be compromised until the second-level key itself was changed. Inn our video
example, the second level key could be changed on a per-video basis, with a new “video”
key for every video requested by the subscriber. Compromising one video key would
mean that the chunk keys for the video would be easily recovered by an eavesdropper,
but that the video key would become worthless at the completion of viewing the video.
The third-level key governs the distribution of second-level keys. Distribution of
second-level keys will depend on the application, for example, the number of video keys
would be the same as the number of different videos requested by a given subscriber. In
our example this would be the “subscriber key” that secures all the subscriber’s video
keys. If a single third-level key was compromised, all videos requested by the subscriber
would be compromised, hence the need for stronger encryption at this level.
There is inevitably a top level of encryption, which may be the third level. It
governs all primary transactions, such as requesting and paying for individual videos,
changing account details, and so on. It should be a form of public-key encryption as this
allows the subscriber to identify themselves securely.
The following picture gives an overview of the interactions between the levels of
encryption, using the three-level video stream as an example:
The lowest level of encryption, the chunk level, will almost always be performed
using a classical (or secret-key) encryption technique, as these are the fastest algorithms
for both encryption and decryption. Similarly, the top level of encryption should use a
strong public-key encryption with a large key, as the data value at this level is very high.
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Intermediate levels of encryption should be chosen to complement the combined strength
of the lower levels, as described in the next paragraph. In every case, the encryption
chosen should make the effort required to illicitly decipher the communications more
than a suspected eavesdropper would be willing to invest for the return.
The effort required for an eavesdropper to decipher all chunk keys should be
roughly similar to the effort required to decipher the next level key, and should cost more
than the data’s potential benefit to the eavesdropper. The same principle applies to
second- and higher-level keys – the effort required to discover all second-level keys
should be similar to that required for the single higher-level key, and so on for all
subsequent levels.
At no stage does the subscriber need to know the individual keys used in this
process, except perhaps the top-level key which will change infrequently. The lower level
keys are exchanged between the sending and receiving host machines, and the user need
not be aware of any encryption taking place at all.
The following table applies three-level encryption to video stream data:
Level Unit of
encryption
Key for
encryption
Type of
encryption
Data hidden
by key
Key life
Lowest all video data chunk key Classical
(secret-key)
10 seconds of
video chunk
10 seconds
Second every chunk
key
Video key Any
appropriate
All chunk
keys, i.e. entire
video
running
time of
video
Top every second
level key
subscriber key public-key
e.g. RSA
All second-
level keys, i.e.
all subscriber
transactions
lifetime of
subscription
The example above is of a three-layer encryption protocol, but there is no reason to
restrict the number of levels to three. The actual number of encryption levels depends on
the application data and the requirements of the vendors. For example, video transmission
could use four levels of encryption, with the second level of keys changing for each entire
video as before, then the third level changed weekly, and the top level per subscriber.
Hierarchical encryption has antecedents in the Enigma cipher machines used by the
German military during World War II. Each operator had what was effectively a one-time
password system, where the day’s password for the entire military was listed in a book,
and was in turn used to transmit “message keys”. While the Enigma cipher was
frequently broken by codebreakers at Bletchley Park, this was achieved only with a
heroic effort, vast human resources and highly specialised codebreaking equipment
(including the first ever electronic computer), and was motivated by the very valuable
data recovered in this way.
The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) mail encryption tool likewise follows a two-level
encryption technology. It is a more modern tool devised in the 1990s to compromise
between the speed of secret-key ciphers and the key ownership characteristics of the
slower public-key ciphers. A message is encrypted with a secret-key cipher, then the key
to the cipher is itself encrypted with the receiver’s public key and appended to the
message which is then transmitted. Hierarchical encryption generalises and improves on
the two-level PGP encryption process, as it intentionally tailors the strength of the
encryption at any level to the value and lifespan of the data being encrypted.
In summary, hierarchical encryption makes it possible to securely transmit data
with minimum commercial loss and maximum speed. We can apply relatively weak
encryption technology to low-value portions of the data, while preserving the overall
value of the data by using strong encryption for the more valuable but less time-critical
facets.
3 NON-SYMBOLIC FRAGMENTATION WITH SIGNAL DIVERSITY
While encryption technologies offer good protection against eavesdropping, there
are other ways to improve security without much performance degradation. If security of
transmission must be better than hierarchical encryption alone, then one complementary
solution is a combination of non-symbolic fragmentation and signal diversity.
3.1 Non-symbolic fragmentation
Non-symbolic fragmentation is the breaking up of data into fragments which are
usually (but not necessarily) different in size to the size of the base unit of data (the
“symbol”) of the application. For example, ASCII data is represented in 8-bit symbols
and Unicode is represented in 16-bit symbols. Breaking up data in this way ensures that
whole symbols are spread across more than one fragment. Fragments are then disordered
and/or divided into one or more fragment streams, usually with no two fragments
adjacent in the fragment stream if they had been adjacent in the original data.
3.2 Signal diversity
Network and path diversity break up a file or data stream into fragments which are
then sent over many different channels, either in the same network or different networks.
For example, a message could be transmitted partly over the phone network and partly
via satellite. TCP/IP does a similar thing in sending packets over different paths, doing so
for load-balancing purposes and is invisible to the end application.
Network and path diversity deliberately introduce the same principle as a secure
communications mechanism - an eavesdropper would need to intercept not just one
transmission path but all paths . Sub-symbolic fragmentation of data is also introduced to
further confuse any intercepted stream of data. This technology can be used with or
without encryption and still remains secure. It is believed that signal diversity could help
reduce unauthorised interception by international surveillance systems such as Echelon.
Signal diversity has been used previously in applications which assign different
frequencies to transmission parts (a form of path diversity) [Globalstar, 2000]. Here path
diversity is performed mostly for purposes of interference-free signal reception, and for
avoiding or minimising network downtime, rather than security reasons. Globalstar
[2000] give the following definition:
Path Diversity is a patented method of signal reception that permits the combining of multiple signals of
varying power strengths into a single coherent signal.
Network diversity exists in practices such as Amazon’s online credit card
purchasing, which allows users to email a part of their credit card number and to
telephone through the rest. Path diversity (also called spread spectrum) is also a security
mechanism and is known to be a strong defence against interception [All.net, 2000].
3.3. Combining non-symbolic fragmentation with signal diversity
Combining non-symbolic fragmentation with signal diversity is done by sending
fragment streams over different paths or networks. Even if some or all of the fragment
streams are intercepted, recovery of the original data is still very difficult. However, there
are still some points of weakness, such as where any eavesdropper intercepting fragment
streams at a single point of weakness (e.g. the site’s firewall machine) can collect all
fragment streams. Masquerading identities of the sending and receiving machines is one
way of making a message’s fragment streams seem unrelated to each other.
A stronger idea is to make very difficult the problem of discovering which
fragments were adjacent in the original data, perhaps even where the actual fragment
boundaries occur in the fragmented data. This can be done in a number of ways.
Disordering the fragments and creating one or more fragment streams provides improved
security if the actual fragmentation is performed using a secret-keyed process that
generates apparently random fragment sizes within the permitted range. In one
implementation, we use a pseudorandom number generator to determine the sequences of
fragment sizes. The initial “seed” value for synchronisation of the pseudorandom number
generator, must be secretly exchanged so that the recipient can duplicate the fragment
size sequence. Alternatively, one can assign fixed-size fragments to fragment streams
using the pseudorandom number sequence, although this is a less robust solution.
There are many benefits in non-symbolic fragmentation combined with signal
diversity, as discussed in [Gilbert and Ashman, 2001], and the core of its benefit is the
apparent randomisation of the data. We have performed experiments which show that
fragmentation combined with signal diversity introduces apparent randomness in data.
This is the same effect that is expected of a reliable encryption algorithm, suggesting that
it is possible to implement fragmentation algorithms which are equivalent to encryption
algorithms in terms of security provided.
It is also possible to combine fragmentation with existing encryption algorithms,
either by applying ciphers before or after fragmentation [Gilbert and Ashman, 2001]. We
are also investigating the properties of variations in fragmentation processes in order to
determine the security and computation time of fragmentation as compared to encryption.
4 CONTINUING WORK
The solutions outlined here go some way to making it possible to transmit
quantities of data with reasonable commercial security but not too much performance
degradation. However, these solutions are specific to protection of the transmitted data en
route to its destination. A commercial data provider might also be concerned with
protection of the data from misuse by the recipient.
Hierarchical encryption and fragmentation with signal diversity are all the better
when combined with technologies for ensuring that data, whether legitimately received or
not, are not subsequently misused. Watermarking technologies discourage copyright
breaches by enabling tracing of origin of misused data, or make it unpleasant or
impossible to use illicitly-copied materials by corrupting the signal, as in [Wang, 2001].
Other supporting work includes the development of modified and new encryption
algorithms and protocols for non-symbolic fragmentation [Gilbert and Ashman, 2001].
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